As we close
in to the Iran presidential election -- read "selection" -- a
more precise look at the policymaking mechanisms at work in this very peculiar
theocratic system is necessary.
The regime
in Iran, with Hassan Rouhani as its president, has been eager to
portray an image of a government mending fences with the international
community.
However, no
beginning of true political change has occurred in Iran despite Rouhani’s
deceptive smiles. The so-called “reformist-moderate” initiative in Iran has
only further strengthened and secured Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and
the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in power.
There is a
misleading notion of two divergent political trends in Iran, one pursuing a
so-called “hardline” approach led by the Khamenei-IRGC camp, and another
claiming a more “reformist” attitude by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and
his mentor and fierce Khamenei rival, the late former presidentAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Yet the
harsh reality is that these seemingly competing trends are quietly harmonious
in practice. Khamenei continues to monopolize power in Iran, while in need of
the rival camp to portray a satisfactory canvas of his regime to the outside
world.
Khamenei has
the last word on all national security and foreign policy matters. Concern at
times raised by outside analysts over escalating tensions between the two sides
over subjects such as the nuclear deal are the result of Iran’s deceptive
propaganda machine at work. The regime, in its entirety, focuses on swaying all
attention far from the true policymaking mechanics at work deep in Tehran.
Rouhani only
became president with Khamenei’s personal blessing, as the latter understood
fully the potential of another 2009-style uprising brewing in Iran. TheGuardian Council, Khamenei’s lever to
control all elections by vetting each and every candidate, enjoys the authority
to bar any individual considered unpalatable. Rest assured that Khamenei
considered Rouhani useful, or else he would have joined the long list of
disqualified others.
Khamenei saw
his regime facing a massive economic crisis threatening to spark a major
uprising after former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, described as a
firebrand, plunged Iran into serious international isolation. Sanctions were
frustrating the Iranian population and the global oil price nosedive added
insult to injury.
At firstglance the IRGC, taking control over a large portion of Iran’s economy, was
benefiting as sanctions burdened private sector competitors. Yet little by
little even the IRGC’s profits began to plunge, and Khamenei realized his
desperate need for sanctions reliefs at the price of taking a major step back
from his nuclear ambitions.
Tehran is
taking advantage of the Iran nuclear deal as a medium to calm domestic unrest
and to revive the IRGC’s former economic stature. To this end, Khamenei needed
a figure such as Rouhani to help convince the international community to make
the deal. Of course, Tehran also enjoyed a major lifeline through the pro-appeasement dogma adopted by U.S. President Barack Obama.
In the
meantime, Khamenei also needed to preserve his domestic image, as kowtowing to
foreign pressure would be recipe for disaster. This is where the regime pursued
a two-faced approach. While Rouhani and his top diplomat, Mohammad Javad Zarif,
played “good cop” shaking hands with the “Great Satan,” Khamenei remains the
“bad cop” in resorting to blatant rhetoric against America and Co.
This
double-standard policy, pursued in parallel, has become the doctrine for the
Iranian regime to maintain control over increasing domestic agitation while
presenting an appealing portrait to the outside world.
While regime
loyalists stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran and Khamenei threatened Riyadh
with “divine revenge,” five American hostages were released in return for the
United Nations declaring Iran in compliance with the nuclear pact.
A further
in-depth evaluation proves Iran’s new economic exchanges with the West are not
parallel to any political improvements. In fact, safeguarding the IRGC’s grip
on the economy is considered vital to enhancing their political position.
The
elimination of 99% of so-called “reformist” candidates in the February 26
parliamentary elections can provide a preview to the upcoming presidential
elections, with higher stakes at play.
No pragmatic
behavior by Iran will render any meaningful change within.
Nor will Tehran ever abandon regional ambitions in which it has invested billions,
including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. In fact, boosting efforts to realize
such objectives is necessary to maintain Iran’s political status quo.
While
Khamenei remains in control, recent developments in Syria, with Russia and
Turkey spearheading a ceasefire agreement, are completely against Iran’s
interests. This is parallel to snowballing dissent inside Iran on the verge of
intense times prior to the May 2017 presidential election. This leaves Khamenei
before a major dilemma over how to play his cards.
“The
37-year-old experience of the destructive and murderous mullahs’ regime in my
country has shown that no degree of political and economic concessions, which
have been carried out at the expense of the Iranian people, have led to a
change of behavior or policies of the Iranian regime either inside or outside
of Iran,” said Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, President of the
National Council of Resistance of Iran, an umbrella group of dissident entities
including the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
Sanctions
relief providing temporary life-support for Tehran won’t last long. The
international community, and the new administration in Washington, should
take advantage of the nuclear deal to increase pressure on Tehran, forcing it
to start actually abiding by international laws and standards.
Heshmat Alavi is a
political and rights activist. His writing focuses on Iran, ranging from human
rights violations, social crackdown, the regime’s support for terrorism and meddling
in foreign countries, and the controversial nuclear program.
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